For a long time, there was an idea of "Arctic Exceptionalism" which sought to look at the Arctic as a non-military region of political cooperation, including cooperation with Russia. This is similar to how Antarctica has been viewed under the Antarctic treaty, although that is changing with increased Chinese activity.
If you look back at the Canadian reaction to then Secretary of State Pompeo's 2019 speech around the time of the Arctic Council meeting (in which he brough security to the forefront, speaking clearly of Russia and China), you will find criticism that the speech 1. Failed to mention climate change (although ti did mention CO2 reduction) and 2. It mentioned the US view of the Northwest Passage. (although Pompeo clearly said that the NWP wasn't a serious issue, that there was an ongoing detente regarding it, and that Russia and China were both far more important to security than the NWP (and the US-Canada Arctic border dispute).
Other reactions regarding climate change were similar. The general idea was that Arctic security was not an appropriate subject for discussion at the Arctic Council (or even elsewhere), as it might jeopardize Russia's participation is shared climate agreement (such as regarding black carbon).
One of the reasons for quoting Dr. Buchanan was to acknowledge the concept of High North framing, which those familiar with the political history of the Arctic would be thinking about in reading this post, without needing to interrupt the direction of the piece with a lengthy explanation for those less familiar.
You're absolutely right, though, and I appreciate you doing the heavy lifting of explaining this in the comments :)
I've been following this region before it was cool, so I'm not sure how much context many have for the current situations.
Next, we can talk about how the Manhattan's transit somewhat enabled Russia's claim to the Northern Sea Route, and how Polar Sea's transit resulted in Canada finally getting a Heavy icebreaker in 2030, although it took 45 years. :D
This ignores years of warnings from the House Defence Committee. Witnesses have long argued that inviting NATO north weakens our claim that the Northwest Passage is "internal waters." That status gives us total control, just like we have over Lake Winnipeg. If we let the alliance in, we risk validating the US view that the passage is an "international strait." Carney is betting that he can get the security without losing the sovereignty.
An interesting take on Carney's framing at Davos. The domestic emphasis on the NWP and icebreakers, while important, presumes a sovereignty 2 or 3-season solution. As a sustained *military* presence, we have Iqaluit and Yellowknife as Hubs, but principally offer on-demand SAR and staging for logistics. Alert, and Eureka are the only government outposts above 76N both dependent on Resolute (or Thule) -- a very thin thread. We have a few satellites, rudimentary underwater approach surveillance, and, eventually, OTHR to augment/replace existing early warning systems. For all that, its *still* 6-8hrs for any substantive 'services' from the south. Eventually, we will have 11 CQ-9b, and 16 P8 (and, even further off, submarines). But its not clear we will place these on regular patrol or base them forward. We don't do that now with the CP-140s, but we did with Lancasters briefly in the '50s. Warfighting assets seems to be from Ottawa, Comox, Greenwood, or Trenton (ok, maybe Cold Lake). Not very Northern. Its not a popular assignment for CAF personnel, but Canada needs actual Northern Air/Sea Bases and it makes me sad that this article implies we might rely on NATO to do it.
Astute analysis. Did this sovereign Arctic policy of Canada's have anything to do with Canada abandoning its NATO obligation to Norway or was that simply an issue of diminishing Canadian capacity?
For a long time, there was an idea of "Arctic Exceptionalism" which sought to look at the Arctic as a non-military region of political cooperation, including cooperation with Russia. This is similar to how Antarctica has been viewed under the Antarctic treaty, although that is changing with increased Chinese activity.
If you look back at the Canadian reaction to then Secretary of State Pompeo's 2019 speech around the time of the Arctic Council meeting (in which he brough security to the forefront, speaking clearly of Russia and China), you will find criticism that the speech 1. Failed to mention climate change (although ti did mention CO2 reduction) and 2. It mentioned the US view of the Northwest Passage. (although Pompeo clearly said that the NWP wasn't a serious issue, that there was an ongoing detente regarding it, and that Russia and China were both far more important to security than the NWP (and the US-Canada Arctic border dispute).
Other reactions regarding climate change were similar. The general idea was that Arctic security was not an appropriate subject for discussion at the Arctic Council (or even elsewhere), as it might jeopardize Russia's participation is shared climate agreement (such as regarding black carbon).
One of the reasons for quoting Dr. Buchanan was to acknowledge the concept of High North framing, which those familiar with the political history of the Arctic would be thinking about in reading this post, without needing to interrupt the direction of the piece with a lengthy explanation for those less familiar.
You're absolutely right, though, and I appreciate you doing the heavy lifting of explaining this in the comments :)
I've been following this region before it was cool, so I'm not sure how much context many have for the current situations.
Next, we can talk about how the Manhattan's transit somewhat enabled Russia's claim to the Northern Sea Route, and how Polar Sea's transit resulted in Canada finally getting a Heavy icebreaker in 2030, although it took 45 years. :D
Another excellent article, Policy Hawk. The defence initiatives pertaining to the Arctic are finally underway, decades later.
This ignores years of warnings from the House Defence Committee. Witnesses have long argued that inviting NATO north weakens our claim that the Northwest Passage is "internal waters." That status gives us total control, just like we have over Lake Winnipeg. If we let the alliance in, we risk validating the US view that the passage is an "international strait." Carney is betting that he can get the security without losing the sovereignty.
An interesting take on Carney's framing at Davos. The domestic emphasis on the NWP and icebreakers, while important, presumes a sovereignty 2 or 3-season solution. As a sustained *military* presence, we have Iqaluit and Yellowknife as Hubs, but principally offer on-demand SAR and staging for logistics. Alert, and Eureka are the only government outposts above 76N both dependent on Resolute (or Thule) -- a very thin thread. We have a few satellites, rudimentary underwater approach surveillance, and, eventually, OTHR to augment/replace existing early warning systems. For all that, its *still* 6-8hrs for any substantive 'services' from the south. Eventually, we will have 11 CQ-9b, and 16 P8 (and, even further off, submarines). But its not clear we will place these on regular patrol or base them forward. We don't do that now with the CP-140s, but we did with Lancasters briefly in the '50s. Warfighting assets seems to be from Ottawa, Comox, Greenwood, or Trenton (ok, maybe Cold Lake). Not very Northern. Its not a popular assignment for CAF personnel, but Canada needs actual Northern Air/Sea Bases and it makes me sad that this article implies we might rely on NATO to do it.
Astute analysis. Did this sovereign Arctic policy of Canada's have anything to do with Canada abandoning its NATO obligation to Norway or was that simply an issue of diminishing Canadian capacity?