I will add a bit to the technical evaluation. Most people don't understand how that technical score was derived.
One of the challenges faced by the evaluation team was constructing an evaluation with different aircraft and capabilities and weapons.
The solution was a scenario based evaluation. The bidders were each given the same set of scenarios/missions to simulate. They had to detail various outputs. But notably how many aircraft to achieve the mission and what ancillaries (targeting pods for example) and weapons were used. Everything they used in their scenario has to be included in their bid.
Turns out a low observable fighter with a lot of sensors and computing power needs fewer aircraft, no ancillaries and fewer weapons to get the job done. This has knock on effects for costs, personnel requirements, etc. across the lifecycle.
Something a lot of Wikipedia warriors don't get is that a targeting pod costing several million, is not a throwaway consideration. It requires an entire supply chain with regular maintenance. And an air force and military short on personnel is going to be substantially more sensitive to total personnel requirements than other costs.
I had a thought that may give the RCAF a solution to the dilemma of what to do with an over priced hanger queen F-35s. The RCAF has never had a dedicated ‘Aggressor Squadron’ for training purposes.
Since purchasing the full wishlist 88 aircraft will render the RCAF’s readiness to its lowest level ever. The balance of the estimated costs for the F-35s would pay for several squadrons of the Gripen as well as missiles and transport aircraft to replace the Hercules.
I still recall an interview with one of the engineers involved in designing the F14, and when he was asked for his opinion of the F35, he called it a ‘turkey’. It is not a practical choice for an air force that will not be operating from well cleaned concrete runways and have access to high tech maintenance needed to keep an F35 going in the Arctic, or Poland or elsewhere in the world.
I hope that the mandrins of NDHQ will get their heads out into daylight long enough to see what is needed by the pilots who will have to go into combat.
I have a feeling it may be a forced situation, since we have already been offered domestic production with Saab, and in the face of a protracted trade war with the US, we will need that as much as we need the aircraft.
It is interesting how narratives have evolved around the Super Hornet and Canadian procurement, both surrounding the interim purchase and the fighter contest. From sources I have spoken with and trust, the Bombardier-Boeing spat was not the primary or even secondary reasoning why either attempt at getting the RCAF Super Hornets failed, but fell to Boeing itself and their US backers.
Apparently, the deal breaker for the interim Super Hornet order was cost and Boeing's conduct specifically within the context of this initiative. Boeing and its lobbyists pitched the interim Super Hornet order to the Canadian Govt as a cheap, quick and easy transition for the RCAF, at something like $65M USD per airframe, as 'that is what the USN buys it for'. Anybody with any passing knowledge can immediately tell that figure isn't indicative of the true procurement cost of the aircraft, which would include all of the external weapons and systems to operate, engines, avionics, training, qualifications, etc alongside the various US FMS/Canadian offset costs which are slapped on.
When the eventual cost just for the aircraft and their required systems ballooned up past the $100M USD (some figures up around $120M USD~) mark, the cost of only 18 aircraft was now significant. Significant to the point where the program pitched as "cheap" was creeping up to some of the acquisition figures the Harper Govt pitched for their F-35A buy, which was not able to be stomached.
The situation had been made worse as figures within the RCAF apparently told the Govt that Boeing figures were false/misrepresented early on in the process, but the Govt did not put much trust in these warnings and went ahead under the assumption Boeing's representation was true/transparent. This mistrust/buying into Boeing's sales pitch was so through that even after DSCA costing was provided by the US Govt, Ottawa did not believe it and sent a specific fact finding mission to Washington to confirm its validity. Once this was confirmed, the deal soured given the true costs and the realization Boeing misrepresented the true cost of the interim purchase in their pitch, on purpose or accidently.
Regarding the Super Hornet's removal from the actual fighter procurement program, I've also heard the issues with communication/cryptography but there was also apparently range anxiety involved. The USN not adopting conformal fuel tanks for the Super Hornet hurt it immensely, as the drag involved with pulling around the required tanks to meet Canadian Arctic range requirements was sub-optimal to say the least. Canada was not willing to be the lone operator, funder and developer of the CFT's and thus the bid suffered greatly. I've also heard Boeing was difficult to deal with and did not provide the required information on dates given for various other aspects, and was thus thrown out as a collective result of all this.
The Bombardier-Boeing spat was likely involved in the back of some officials heads during these events, but my sources specifically state it was not anywhere near as influential as the media likes to portray. It is a very convenient smokescreen to cover up both the Canadian Govt and Boeing incompetency throughout both processes.
This is believable. Thanks. What struck true to me was the obvious mistrust the GoC has for their own military advisors. This has been an ongoing problem for decades, an issue that is also supported by many of the media, which in turn gets the PMO’s attention. They feed off each other, to the detriment of the CAF. Hence there has been an ongoing culture of mistrust between the CAF, especially the RCAF, and the GoC since the Avro Arrow was cancelled.
Great comprehensive outline of the Canadian F-35 story so far. Brought up some facts I had forgotten about and man that 5 Billion in F35 parts so far jumps out.
I am an airforce brat and still an aviation geek but boy does this article really illustrate a large problem we have in Canada when it comes to defence. Primarily that most Canadians are in the words of former CDS Eyre “ defence illiterate” and that includes most of the civilian leadership that will sign the cheques.
Throw in the VERY deep feelings Canadians have about the President and then we get the F!@& Trump FEELINGS driving our Defence policy and who cares what future Canadian fighter pilots have to trust to bring him home.
All of this debate also illustrates that not too deep down Canadians are still exorcising the intellectual fall back position we have lived for decades. “ The Americans will do it” so why be serious about our own defence . Carney at least seems to have a plan and I would not be surprised that after CUSMA gets rejigged that the government quietly just keeps buying the next F 35 tranches. Where are the Gripen lovers going to vote?
Thank you for this chronology, PH. I have my own opinion on the composition of our future fighter fleet but the clock ticks away on the CF18, notwithstanding the HEP for some aircraft. They have provided stellar service and want a nice peaceful retirement as soon as practicable.
I'd like to see enough for two full squadrons of F-35's at Bagotville & Cold lake. I am open to the idea of a 4.5 gen for domestic air policing & bonus if there is an airframe that is meant to work in the extreme cold of the north.
And if “policing” jets are all of a sudden needed to go into combat, what then? Also, having one F-35 Sqn in BG and one in OD doesn’t make logistical or financial sense. They’d have to be located at one base. Training and basing for another jet would have to be centred at another base to make any sense of it.
If the RCAF is forced to go into combat with Gripen E/F, we're likely going to lose pilots and aircraft even against a non-peer threat. The Gripen E/F can hold its own right now, today however, more advanced sensors, targeting systems and weapons are making 4th generation fighters increasingly obsolete. Not even touching the fact 5th generation stealth fighters themselves are actively proliferating around the world, example being Algeria receiving the SU-57 from Russia and many other nations developing them. We've seen what happens to 4th gen aircraft over Iran, a number of F-15's have been lost and even an F-35 has been damaged.
It isn't fiscally or militarily responsible to invest in 4th generation platforms in 2026, with delivery into the mid-late 2030's and operation going 20+ years after that.
well after the f-35 completes the SEAD, the Gripen would be good for air policing in that situation as well. Plus, with the Meteor already integrated, it could work in conjunction with the f-35s for anti air as well, effectively combining the F-35's sensors with the extended range of the meteor. As far as the basing comments, take it up with the RCAF as that is the current plan.
Sorry Mathew, I thought you meant a total of two sqns. So two sqns each at BG and OD. Sure. Maybe only 65 as per the Cons original plan if Gripens were to fill in. I’d want the Gripens to have a fleet of CCAs with them. My concern is with the evolving stealth threats that will challenge our fighters in the near future where the advantage of the Meteor missile will be negligible. Can’t shoot what you can’t see.
I'm not a Gripen advocate, but have been warming to the idea somewhat so long as we have sufficient numbers of f-35's. Meteor scenario where gripens and f-35 work in conjunction with each other.
No argument from me. Note that the USAF is cancelling their red air contracts that use Gen 4 jets and are reviving their red air squadrons with early F-35s. The Gen 4s just don’t have training value as they fly around like sitting ducks.
I like the KF21 Also.. problem is its still in development and uses lots of US equipment same as Gripen. We need planes asap, I really dont know how we can resolve this.
I will add a bit to the technical evaluation. Most people don't understand how that technical score was derived.
One of the challenges faced by the evaluation team was constructing an evaluation with different aircraft and capabilities and weapons.
The solution was a scenario based evaluation. The bidders were each given the same set of scenarios/missions to simulate. They had to detail various outputs. But notably how many aircraft to achieve the mission and what ancillaries (targeting pods for example) and weapons were used. Everything they used in their scenario has to be included in their bid.
Turns out a low observable fighter with a lot of sensors and computing power needs fewer aircraft, no ancillaries and fewer weapons to get the job done. This has knock on effects for costs, personnel requirements, etc. across the lifecycle.
Something a lot of Wikipedia warriors don't get is that a targeting pod costing several million, is not a throwaway consideration. It requires an entire supply chain with regular maintenance. And an air force and military short on personnel is going to be substantially more sensitive to total personnel requirements than other costs.
I had a thought that may give the RCAF a solution to the dilemma of what to do with an over priced hanger queen F-35s. The RCAF has never had a dedicated ‘Aggressor Squadron’ for training purposes.
Since purchasing the full wishlist 88 aircraft will render the RCAF’s readiness to its lowest level ever. The balance of the estimated costs for the F-35s would pay for several squadrons of the Gripen as well as missiles and transport aircraft to replace the Hercules.
I still recall an interview with one of the engineers involved in designing the F14, and when he was asked for his opinion of the F35, he called it a ‘turkey’. It is not a practical choice for an air force that will not be operating from well cleaned concrete runways and have access to high tech maintenance needed to keep an F35 going in the Arctic, or Poland or elsewhere in the world.
I hope that the mandrins of NDHQ will get their heads out into daylight long enough to see what is needed by the pilots who will have to go into combat.
I have a feeling it may be a forced situation, since we have already been offered domestic production with Saab, and in the face of a protracted trade war with the US, we will need that as much as we need the aircraft.
It is interesting how narratives have evolved around the Super Hornet and Canadian procurement, both surrounding the interim purchase and the fighter contest. From sources I have spoken with and trust, the Bombardier-Boeing spat was not the primary or even secondary reasoning why either attempt at getting the RCAF Super Hornets failed, but fell to Boeing itself and their US backers.
Apparently, the deal breaker for the interim Super Hornet order was cost and Boeing's conduct specifically within the context of this initiative. Boeing and its lobbyists pitched the interim Super Hornet order to the Canadian Govt as a cheap, quick and easy transition for the RCAF, at something like $65M USD per airframe, as 'that is what the USN buys it for'. Anybody with any passing knowledge can immediately tell that figure isn't indicative of the true procurement cost of the aircraft, which would include all of the external weapons and systems to operate, engines, avionics, training, qualifications, etc alongside the various US FMS/Canadian offset costs which are slapped on.
When the eventual cost just for the aircraft and their required systems ballooned up past the $100M USD (some figures up around $120M USD~) mark, the cost of only 18 aircraft was now significant. Significant to the point where the program pitched as "cheap" was creeping up to some of the acquisition figures the Harper Govt pitched for their F-35A buy, which was not able to be stomached.
The situation had been made worse as figures within the RCAF apparently told the Govt that Boeing figures were false/misrepresented early on in the process, but the Govt did not put much trust in these warnings and went ahead under the assumption Boeing's representation was true/transparent. This mistrust/buying into Boeing's sales pitch was so through that even after DSCA costing was provided by the US Govt, Ottawa did not believe it and sent a specific fact finding mission to Washington to confirm its validity. Once this was confirmed, the deal soured given the true costs and the realization Boeing misrepresented the true cost of the interim purchase in their pitch, on purpose or accidently.
Regarding the Super Hornet's removal from the actual fighter procurement program, I've also heard the issues with communication/cryptography but there was also apparently range anxiety involved. The USN not adopting conformal fuel tanks for the Super Hornet hurt it immensely, as the drag involved with pulling around the required tanks to meet Canadian Arctic range requirements was sub-optimal to say the least. Canada was not willing to be the lone operator, funder and developer of the CFT's and thus the bid suffered greatly. I've also heard Boeing was difficult to deal with and did not provide the required information on dates given for various other aspects, and was thus thrown out as a collective result of all this.
The Bombardier-Boeing spat was likely involved in the back of some officials heads during these events, but my sources specifically state it was not anywhere near as influential as the media likes to portray. It is a very convenient smokescreen to cover up both the Canadian Govt and Boeing incompetency throughout both processes.
This is believable. Thanks. What struck true to me was the obvious mistrust the GoC has for their own military advisors. This has been an ongoing problem for decades, an issue that is also supported by many of the media, which in turn gets the PMO’s attention. They feed off each other, to the detriment of the CAF. Hence there has been an ongoing culture of mistrust between the CAF, especially the RCAF, and the GoC since the Avro Arrow was cancelled.
We cannot trust the United States any more. They could cut us off from software upgrades any time they had a dispute with us. Go with the Gripen ❣️
Great comprehensive outline of the Canadian F-35 story so far. Brought up some facts I had forgotten about and man that 5 Billion in F35 parts so far jumps out.
I am an airforce brat and still an aviation geek but boy does this article really illustrate a large problem we have in Canada when it comes to defence. Primarily that most Canadians are in the words of former CDS Eyre “ defence illiterate” and that includes most of the civilian leadership that will sign the cheques.
Throw in the VERY deep feelings Canadians have about the President and then we get the F!@& Trump FEELINGS driving our Defence policy and who cares what future Canadian fighter pilots have to trust to bring him home.
All of this debate also illustrates that not too deep down Canadians are still exorcising the intellectual fall back position we have lived for decades. “ The Americans will do it” so why be serious about our own defence . Carney at least seems to have a plan and I would not be surprised that after CUSMA gets rejigged that the government quietly just keeps buying the next F 35 tranches. Where are the Gripen lovers going to vote?
BECAUSE American F35s SUCK. SEND THEM BACK
Thank you for this chronology, PH. I have my own opinion on the composition of our future fighter fleet but the clock ticks away on the CF18, notwithstanding the HEP for some aircraft. They have provided stellar service and want a nice peaceful retirement as soon as practicable.
I'd like to see enough for two full squadrons of F-35's at Bagotville & Cold lake. I am open to the idea of a 4.5 gen for domestic air policing & bonus if there is an airframe that is meant to work in the extreme cold of the north.
And if “policing” jets are all of a sudden needed to go into combat, what then? Also, having one F-35 Sqn in BG and one in OD doesn’t make logistical or financial sense. They’d have to be located at one base. Training and basing for another jet would have to be centred at another base to make any sense of it.
If the RCAF is forced to go into combat with Gripen E/F, we're likely going to lose pilots and aircraft even against a non-peer threat. The Gripen E/F can hold its own right now, today however, more advanced sensors, targeting systems and weapons are making 4th generation fighters increasingly obsolete. Not even touching the fact 5th generation stealth fighters themselves are actively proliferating around the world, example being Algeria receiving the SU-57 from Russia and many other nations developing them. We've seen what happens to 4th gen aircraft over Iran, a number of F-15's have been lost and even an F-35 has been damaged.
It isn't fiscally or militarily responsible to invest in 4th generation platforms in 2026, with delivery into the mid-late 2030's and operation going 20+ years after that.
well after the f-35 completes the SEAD, the Gripen would be good for air policing in that situation as well. Plus, with the Meteor already integrated, it could work in conjunction with the f-35s for anti air as well, effectively combining the F-35's sensors with the extended range of the meteor. As far as the basing comments, take it up with the RCAF as that is the current plan.
Sorry Mathew, I thought you meant a total of two sqns. So two sqns each at BG and OD. Sure. Maybe only 65 as per the Cons original plan if Gripens were to fill in. I’d want the Gripens to have a fleet of CCAs with them. My concern is with the evolving stealth threats that will challenge our fighters in the near future where the advantage of the Meteor missile will be negligible. Can’t shoot what you can’t see.
I'm not a Gripen advocate, but have been warming to the idea somewhat so long as we have sufficient numbers of f-35's. Meteor scenario where gripens and f-35 work in conjunction with each other.
No argument from me. Note that the USAF is cancelling their red air contracts that use Gen 4 jets and are reviving their red air squadrons with early F-35s. The Gen 4s just don’t have training value as they fly around like sitting ducks.
…don’t
We never should have signed up for this lemon and it's appalling mission readiness rates.
The twin-engined Korean stealth fighter would have been a much better fit for Canada, with no Gripens required.
I like the KF21 Also.. problem is its still in development and uses lots of US equipment same as Gripen. We need planes asap, I really dont know how we can resolve this.