If you find value in my work, please like it and share it broadly. The more reach my work has, the more I’m able to write.
When NATO leaders gather in Ankara this week, most international attention will focus on two issues. The first is managing the collective — and increasingly complex — relationship between NATO’s European members and the United States. The second is sustaining support for Ukraine as it continues its war against Russia. Together, these will consume the bulk of political and diplomatic bandwidth at the summit.
What attention remains will likely be directed toward a more technocratic, but no less consequential, task: mapping out how allies intend to meet last year’s commitment to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.
But for those watching more closely, there is a secondary story worth tracking. Canada — the often-overlooked North American member of NATO — is arriving in Ankara with unusual momentum. A series of recent decisions and announcements suggest this summit could mark a turning point in how Canada is perceived within the alliance, and how it chooses to position itself in the decades ahead.
For years, the simplest measure of burden-sharing within NATO was the 2% of GDP defence spending benchmark. It was an imperfect metric, but a politically powerful one. As recently as last year’s summit, Canada arrived spending just 1.4% of GDP, even as a newly elected prime minister reiterated a fresh promise to reach 2%.
This year is different. Canada has now crossed that threshold.
Critics at home have been quick to qualify the achievement. Some point out that Canada only narrowly cleared the 2% mark, while others note that not all of the increase reflects new spending — most notably the $1.38 billion reallocation of the Canadian Coast Guard into the Department of National Defence.
Those critiques are not without merit. But they are also largely domestic in their relevance. Internationally, what stands out is the scale of the increase. A $19.5 billion rise in defence spending in a single year. By that measure, Canada ranks among the top contributors to spending growth within the alliance — outpacing countries like the United Kingdom, France, and even the United States in year-over-year increases.
To put that into perspective, when Finland joined NATO in 2023, considerable attention was paid to the capabilities it brought with it. Canada’s single-year increase in defence spending is, in purely financial terms, equivalent to adding roughly one-and-a-half Finlands to the alliance.
That comparison is imperfect — Finland contributes far more than just its budget — but it underscores the scale of Canada’s recent shift. Combined with an interim target of 4% by 2030, on the way to 5% by 2035, Canada now enters the summit in a stronger position than many of its peers.
Prime Minister Carney is also expected to arrive in Ankara on the heels of a major procurement announcement. The selection of a design for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project.
While some NATO allies may be disappointed if Canada opts for a South Korean design — as current speculation suggests — the broader significance of the decision will not be lost. A commitment to acquire twelve submarines represents a generational investment in naval capability.
Indeed, if delivered as planned, a fleet of twelve modern submarines could position Canada as one of NATO’s most capable operators of undersea warfare assets — arguably second only to the United States in terms of attack submarine capacity. That ranking may evolve as other allies invest in their own fleets, but the point remains. In an alliance increasingly focused on deterrence, maritime security, and contested access, this investment will give Canada leverage.
Beyond procurement, Canada is also attempting to shape the financial architecture of NATO’s rearmament.
In April, it was announced that Canada would host a new Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) — a multinational financing mechanism aimed at accelerating defence industrial investment. If successfully launched, the initiative could give Canada outsized influence in one of NATO’s most pressing challenges — translating political commitments into industrial output.
Since the announcement, negotiations with partner nations have continued behind closed doors. If those discussions have progressed sufficiently, Ankara would provide an ideal opportunity to formally launch the bank.
Canada’s recent agreement to participate in the European Union’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence financing and procurement program further reinforces this shift toward industrial integration.
As the first non-European country to join the initiative, Canada has positioned itself as a bridge between North American and European defence markets. The practical implications of that decision may begin to materialize in Ankara, where announcements tied to SAFE-enabled procurement deals are likely.
One particularly notable area to watch is airborne early warning and control. NATO is widely expected to move toward adopting Saab’s GlobalEye platform as a successor to its aging AWACS fleet. The aircraft is Swedish-designed, but built on a Canadian-made airframe — and Canada has already selected it for its own use.
While details remain under negotiation, there is growing speculation that Canada could play a broader role in production, extending beyond domestic procurement to support future allied orders. If realized, that would represent a tangible example of Canada embedding itself within NATO’s evolving industrial base.
Another potential announcement — though less certain — is the outcome of Canada’s long-running fighter review.
Reports in June suggested that a decision on whether to supplement or partially replace Canada’s F-35 acquisition with Saab Gripen fighters is effectively complete, with timing the only remaining question. If accurate, the NATO summit would provide a high-profile venue for the announcement.
Finally, there is the question of the Arctic — an area where Canadian policy has historically diverged from NATO’s institutional approach.
Canada has long been cautious about embedding Arctic security within NATO frameworks, in part because most NATO members don’t recognize the full extent of Canada’s maritime claims in the Arctic.
But that position has shown signs of softening in recent months since NATO allies deployed assets to Greenland in response to renewed U.S. rhetoric about acquiring the island. In the aftermath, Canadian officials have been more open to discussions about a greater NATO role in the region.
If that shift is real, Ankara could serve as a venue for early signals — if not formal agreements, then at least frameworks for future cooperation. Even modest movement on this file would represent a notable evolution in Canada’s approach.
Taken together, from a Canadian perspective, this summit still has the potential to be consequential. Whether it makes headlines outside — or even inside — Canada, the country is positioned to accomplish a fair amount this week. The summit’s centre of gravity lies elsewhere — in Washington, in Kyiv, and in the broader question of NATO’s future cohesion. Even so, Ankara may offer a useful indication of how Canada’s role within the alliance is beginning to evolve.
Thank you for reading my work! If you found value in it, please consider liking, sharing, and leaving a comment. The more reach my work has, the more I’m able to write.
Solid overview. Can't wait to hear about the DSRB.
I always enjoy reading your analysis of our current situation in this always changing geopolitical climate.