Good article, PH. It is best to leave Nanisivik on the back burner. At least Grays Bay can serve two purposes. The AOPS can easily fuelup in Grays Bay, move east or west and cover the northern leg of the Northwest Passage.
An Arctic port is a heavy lift but we’ve done these things before.
There's no guarantee Grays Bay will work out. But, at least, we're trying to build the right facility in the right place. And not choosing the location because we think it will be easy might actually make the whole project easier, if that makes sense.
I saw at least one person who accidentally posted a picture of Mary River, which is the mine site ~100km inland, and identifying it as the port. Is it possible you saw the same thing?
The port (Milne) is connected to the mine site (Mary River) and the 6500’ airport by an all season road, currently used to move ore from mine to the ship loader. Once the company stops shipping ore from Milne in favour of its new port at Steensby the current ore lay-down area (1 to 2 km long) will be vacant and a potential location for an additional airstrip located beside existing deepwater port/500 person accommodations/tank farm/warehousing/power plant/sewage and water treatment facilities - all of which the company plans to continue to use/maintain but at a much reduced rate. Sounds like it might be useful for something especially on a simple pay for use basis rather than building/buying infrastructure. But it doesn’t solve the valid geography problem you point out.
I saw Prime Minister Carney announce the Grays Bay Road and Port last week in his $35 billion North plan. It matches the western site the Navy actually wants. Milne Inlet might buy some time, but Nanisivik's two-decade wait shows why rushing these easy fixes rarely works in the Arctic.
The real value of this piece isn’t in dismissing the Milne Inlet idea outright, but in explaining the government’s cautious, non-committal response.
First, there is no formal offer to accept. Baffinland’s chair merely signaled he’s "open to a conversation." No government rushes to commit to a vague concept with zero details on cost, terms, or timelines—doing so would be negotiating malpractice.
Second, the ghost of Nanisivik looms large. That project was pitched as a quick, easy conversion of existing mine infrastructure. Twenty years later, it hasn’t refueled a single ship and has become a cautionary tale in rushed due diligence. The discovery that a nearby airstrip was slated for closure is exactly the kind of detail missed when political will outraces planning. It’s no surprise officials now insist on far more rigorous scrutiny.
The article also identifies the location problem: Milne Inlet is even farther east than Nanisivik. The Harry DeWolf-class ships have a 12,000km range, rendering fuel stops there marginal. The Navy’s real need is west, which is why the government is focusing on Grays Bay.
This doesn't mean Milne Inlet is useless. A low-risk, pay-for-access arrangement could be a pragmatic bridge until Grays Bay is operational and a face-saving exit from the Nanisivik fiasco. But the government’s reluctance to treat this as an "easy win" is not indecision—it’s a hard-earned lesson in the difference between what looks good in a headline and what actually works in the Arctic.
I'll note that the article itself is thoughtful and accurately explains the government's likely reasoning, so my reply largely reinforces and condenses its key arguments to support the government's cautious approach.
Great write-up. I have always held that an east Arctic base is a dumb idea. All of them are only currently open from June-July till October at best. I have held that we should negotiate a deal with Denmark/Greenland for a joint infrastructure agreement at NUUK. Pier or two and refueling infrastructure at their new Naval Base there. It provides us with year round ice edge refueling and the consistent presence of Canadian military and CCG ships would provide all year Arctic visibility. It would be the best way to show the world we are taking Arctic duties seriously. My 2 cents.
The AOPS may not need the fuel but it seems that the proposed Corvettes would have the ability to travel north to the Arctic. Would they need the refueling capacity in Eastern Arctic? I don't think they will be designed with the range of the AOPS.
Topshee’s publicly talked about a desire for the Continental Defence Corvette to have a range of 7000 nautical miles, which is almost 13,000km.
My crystal ball is too foggy to tell if that's what it will end up being (if the project goes ahead at all). But there's a desire for even more range than the AOPS has.
Good article, PH. It is best to leave Nanisivik on the back burner. At least Grays Bay can serve two purposes. The AOPS can easily fuelup in Grays Bay, move east or west and cover the northern leg of the Northwest Passage.
An Arctic port is a heavy lift but we’ve done these things before.
There's no guarantee Grays Bay will work out. But, at least, we're trying to build the right facility in the right place. And not choosing the location because we think it will be easy might actually make the whole project easier, if that makes sense.
Weird, I though the announcement had an overhead photo showing a runway next to a heliport and the main facilities with a few zones for camps 💁🏻
I saw at least one person who accidentally posted a picture of Mary River, which is the mine site ~100km inland, and identifying it as the port. Is it possible you saw the same thing?
Found the source, it shows Mary River but I missed that. https://x.com/exnerpirot/status/2033346354035163288?s=61&t=ndcduV32lJS_PasZXsqsdg
Yeah, she responded to someone mentioning the error and posted a correction: https://x.com/ExnerPirot/status/2033370493877924190?s=20
I feel like it's natural that people will confuse the sites, though, which is why I included the bit about the runways here.
The port (Milne) is connected to the mine site (Mary River) and the 6500’ airport by an all season road, currently used to move ore from mine to the ship loader. Once the company stops shipping ore from Milne in favour of its new port at Steensby the current ore lay-down area (1 to 2 km long) will be vacant and a potential location for an additional airstrip located beside existing deepwater port/500 person accommodations/tank farm/warehousing/power plant/sewage and water treatment facilities - all of which the company plans to continue to use/maintain but at a much reduced rate. Sounds like it might be useful for something especially on a simple pay for use basis rather than building/buying infrastructure. But it doesn’t solve the valid geography problem you point out.
Terrific background story and information I simply new nothing about. Thanks for writing this piece. This is the fabric of Canadiana.
I saw Prime Minister Carney announce the Grays Bay Road and Port last week in his $35 billion North plan. It matches the western site the Navy actually wants. Milne Inlet might buy some time, but Nanisivik's two-decade wait shows why rushing these easy fixes rarely works in the Arctic.
The real value of this piece isn’t in dismissing the Milne Inlet idea outright, but in explaining the government’s cautious, non-committal response.
First, there is no formal offer to accept. Baffinland’s chair merely signaled he’s "open to a conversation." No government rushes to commit to a vague concept with zero details on cost, terms, or timelines—doing so would be negotiating malpractice.
Second, the ghost of Nanisivik looms large. That project was pitched as a quick, easy conversion of existing mine infrastructure. Twenty years later, it hasn’t refueled a single ship and has become a cautionary tale in rushed due diligence. The discovery that a nearby airstrip was slated for closure is exactly the kind of detail missed when political will outraces planning. It’s no surprise officials now insist on far more rigorous scrutiny.
The article also identifies the location problem: Milne Inlet is even farther east than Nanisivik. The Harry DeWolf-class ships have a 12,000km range, rendering fuel stops there marginal. The Navy’s real need is west, which is why the government is focusing on Grays Bay.
This doesn't mean Milne Inlet is useless. A low-risk, pay-for-access arrangement could be a pragmatic bridge until Grays Bay is operational and a face-saving exit from the Nanisivik fiasco. But the government’s reluctance to treat this as an "easy win" is not indecision—it’s a hard-earned lesson in the difference between what looks good in a headline and what actually works in the Arctic.
I'll note that the article itself is thoughtful and accurately explains the government's likely reasoning, so my reply largely reinforces and condenses its key arguments to support the government's cautious approach.
Time to kero eyes peeled and not lean simply on sentiment
Great write-up. I have always held that an east Arctic base is a dumb idea. All of them are only currently open from June-July till October at best. I have held that we should negotiate a deal with Denmark/Greenland for a joint infrastructure agreement at NUUK. Pier or two and refueling infrastructure at their new Naval Base there. It provides us with year round ice edge refueling and the consistent presence of Canadian military and CCG ships would provide all year Arctic visibility. It would be the best way to show the world we are taking Arctic duties seriously. My 2 cents.
The AOPS may not need the fuel but it seems that the proposed Corvettes would have the ability to travel north to the Arctic. Would they need the refueling capacity in Eastern Arctic? I don't think they will be designed with the range of the AOPS.
Topshee’s publicly talked about a desire for the Continental Defence Corvette to have a range of 7000 nautical miles, which is almost 13,000km.
My crystal ball is too foggy to tell if that's what it will end up being (if the project goes ahead at all). But there's a desire for even more range than the AOPS has.
Ottawa seems to “hear” nothing important.